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This study investigates the existence of political rents in bank lending, using a 
comprehensive loan-level dataset of the universe of commercial loans in 
Mexico from 2003 to 2012. Identification relies on changes in the state of 
origin of a senate committee chairman as a source of exogenous variation in 
firms’ political relationship. I find that banks offer favourable loan terms to 
politically connected firms with larger loan quantities, lower loan spread, 
longer maturity and lower collateral requirements. Furthermore, political loans 
exhibit higher default rates. To isolate the bank supply channel, this study 
includes a rich set of fixed-effects with various specifications. The favourable 
lending increases with the strength of a firm’s political connection, the 
politician’s power and is offered by large and domestic banks. Consistent with 
the quid pro quo hypothesis I find that the banks that extend political loans 
receive significantly more government borrowings with better credit quality. 
Greater credit supply due to political connection leads to a large and 
significant increase in firm-level employment but not in revenue. Besides, I 
provide estimates of the total social cost of political lending and net revenue 
for banks that are engaged in the rent provision activity. Finally, I perform a 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Economists have long perceived political rent seeking as a major hurdle to 
efficient resource allocation in financial markets, e.g. it can distort banks’ 
lending decisions
1
.  Theoretically, it is easy to model political rent seeking in 
the banking sector with government-owned banks providing favours to 
politically connected firms (e.g. Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
Advocates of bank privatization argue that it will eliminate the politically 
motivated resource allocation, engender competition, boost efficiency and 
ultimately diminish rent-seeking behaviour (e.g. Shleifer, 1998; Roland, 2008). 
However, critics claim that privatization actually does not change the 
requirement of government management and will lead to the loss of benefits 
provided via public services to the whole society (e.g. Moe, 1996). In light of 
the this debate, it is surprising that there are no studies examining the effect of 
rent seeking on credit supply in an economy with a fully privatized banking 
sector.  
In this paper, I try to fill this gap and study the existence of political rents in 
bank lending in Mexico, a country with no government-owned commercial 
banks, using the universe of commercial loans from 2003 to 2012
2
.  To the 
best of my knowledge, this paper is among the very few studies employing a 
panel loan-level dataset representing overall lending in one particular country 
(also see Khwaja and Mian, 2005, 2008). For identification, this study relies 
                                                 
1
 See Olken and Pande (2011) for a review of the literature on political rent seeking and 
efficient resource allocation and also La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003) for a detailed 
description of banking in Mexico. 
2
 The banking sector in Mexico provides a unique setting for us to examine the issue because 




on changes in senate committee chairmanship as exogenous variation in firms’ 
political relationship and uses a geographical-based measure of political 
connection: whether the firm is located in a state that elects a senator who at a 
particular time chaired an important senate committee
3
.  Such political 
connection is likely to be valued by commercial banks since chairing a 
committee signals political importance. Chairmanship is entrusted with 
discretional power over economic resources and by virtue of their political 
importance, chairmen are perceived to be able to influence policies and 
legislation affecting specific industries, among which banking
4
. 
This paper first establishes that firms headquartered in the state that elected a 
senator chairing a commission receive more generous loan terms. Since the 
chairmanship is determined through the bargaining among different political 
parties once all senators are elected, the ascension to chairmanship is basically 
unrelated to either tactical voting or events and conditions in the chairman’s 
state. I isolate the bank-lending channel by focusing on a firm’s borrowing 
pattern over time by using firm*bank fixed-effects. These fixed-effects allow 
me to fully absorb invariant firm-specific fundamentals that proxy for credit 
demand, by comparing how a firm's loan terms vary from when a chairman 
resides in the same state to when the chairman does not. Additionally, the 
fixed-effects control for banking relationships, since previous studies have 
found that repeated borrowing from the same lender can translate into better 
loan terms (i.e. Baharth et al., 2011).  Finally, I saturate this specification with 
                                                 
3
 Similar measures were adopted in previous studies (e.g. Cohen, Coval and Malloy, 2011; 
Kostovetsky, 2015). 
4
 As an example of chairman’s power in influencing fund allocation, when senator Jorge 
Nordhausen González took over as the Chairman of the Energy Committee in 2003, his 
private company SICSA increased by 1,300 percent the average annual contracts received 




bank*quarter and industry*quarter fixed-effects to control for unobserved 
time-varying shocks to the bank and industry fundamentals such as risk or 
investment opportunities.  
In the baseline analysis, I employ a broad definition of political connection 
identifying 45 percent of loans as politically connected.  According to this 
classification, being politically connected leads to a 0.7 percent increase in the 
loan volume lent by commercial banks, and to a 5.0 and 6.0 percent reduction 
in the interest rate spread and probability of collateral requirement.  I also find 
significant effect, albeit economically marginal, on loan duration.  Finally, I 
show that political loans exhibit significantly worse performance with the 
default probability rising 12 percent.  This fact challenges the hypothesis that 
improved loan terms reflect better credit quality of politically connected firms.   
To further validate this identification, I narrow down the political connection 
measure by focusing on firms that, in addition to being headquartered in the 
same state, have stronger links to the politicians (see Khawja and Mian 2008). 
These stronger relations arise either because a firm operates in the industry 
related to the purview of the chairman’s committee, or because it is located in 
the same municipality in which the chairman lives
5
.   The economic 
magnitude of the political lending result becomes substantially larger.  For 
example, a stronger political relation – either same sector or same municipality 
– increases loan volume by around 2.7 and 2.1 percent respectively. 
                                                 
5
 An example of a narrower political connection is that of a firm operating in the agricultural 




As an illustrative example of the importance of political connections in the 
banking sector, we can consider the case when a senator from the state of 
Colima was appointed as the chairman of the agriculture committee in 
September of 2006. Figure 1 contrasts the dynamics of credit supply to 
agriculture and all industries of Colima with that of the average state in 
Mexico (excluding Colima) around the appointment time. In the year leading 
up to the appointment, lending to Colima exhibited a similar pattern to the rest 
of the states of Mexico. However, immediately after the appointment of the 
committee chairman, lending to the agriculture industry in Colima more than 
doubled during the four quarters after the appointment, while lending to other 
industries in Colima was actually reduced. Elsewhere, lending to the 
agriculture sector in the remaining Mexican states increased at a more 
moderate pace. 
This study next explores the relative importance of bank characteristics in the 
context of political lending.  More concretely, I contrast the lending patterns 
across two dimensions: bank size (small/large) and ownership (domestic 
/foreign).  I find that large and domestic banks engage more in political 
lending.  This is consistent with the presence of economies of scale in political 
lending, and with the fact that the leadership of domestic banks tends to have 
stronger relations with national politicians. Moreover, politically connected 
firm receives greater preferential treatment when its politician has stronger 
political power. 
As reward for offering political rents, I show that banks that engage more in 
political lending receive significantly more government borrowings, and with 
better quality. This finding suggests that politicians are manipulating their 
5 
 
political power over government borrowing in order to offer benefits to the 
banks in return for the political loans. I further investigate the effect of 
political lending on the firm’s real economic activity and find a strong and 
significant effect on employment outcomes. More concretely, the 
chairmanship of a given committee is associated with a 2.1 percent increase in 
employment for firms headquartered in the chairman’s state. But I find little 
impact on the firm’s financial performance. Consistent with frictions due to 
asymmetric information in the “large versus small” literature, the impact of 
credit supply channel varies with firm size, and the effect is significantly 
stronger for small firms.  
To explore the robustness of the findings, I conduct a series of tests to rule out 
alternative explanations and show the pattern holds under a variety of 
specifications. The first part is to address the concern that the chairmanship 
may be selected based on the economic performance of the chairman’s state. 
Second, I show that the political rent does not vary with the firm size, 
contradicting the social purpose lending hypothesis predicting relatively more 
political lending for small firms. Finally, I run falsification tests by randomly 
assigning the state of each chairman and show that the political lending pattern 
disappears.  I also estimate the same specifications using the less relevant 
committees when constructing the measure of political connection and find 
that the effect wanes.  
Given the comprehensive coverage of this loan data, I estimate the economic 
cost of the documented political rents by focusing on the two dimensions that  
can inferred from the data. First, the deadweight loss from the increase in 
default loans is estimated to be 0.4 basis point of Mexico’s GDP annually. 
6 
 
Given one OECD report that the cost of political rents averages about 5 
percent of the total GDP, political lending comprises 0.08 percent of total 
amount of political rents in Mexico
6
.  Second, I document evidence of 
additional cost due to the distortion of commercial credit allocation: firms in 
the chairman’s state but not in the same industry suffer from credit under 
provision as a result of the political lending. As an extension, I show that 
banks reap net benefit from engaging in the rent provision activity and the net 
revenue is on average 1.6 percent of the annual net income.  
Two potential mechanisms can explain the results. First, politicians exert their 
influence on banks through bank management appointments (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005; Carvalho, 2014). However, this mechanism is most likely 
prevalent in economies with public banks where management appointments 
are controlled by politicians. In these settings, politicians may channel 
additional lending to their state and sector to help themselves/their party in the 
upcoming election. The results provide support for the alternative view that 
banks channel lending to politically connected firms to exchange favors with 
politicians. That is, though the lending decision of private banks is not subject 
to direct pressure from politicians, banks still have incentives to adapt to 
political developments and adjust lending to cater to the needs of politicians as 
an alternative way of campaign contributions and lobbying. The benefits may 
include favorable policies and regulations like government intervention for 
bailout (Dinc, 2005; Kostovetsky, 2015), personal “perks” to bank top 
management (Bertrand et al, 2007) and additional revenue to the bank’s 
business that I provide evidence for in the paper. One concern is that private 
                                                 
6
 The report can be found at http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf. 
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banks do not have the advantage of soft budget constraints like government 
organizations. However, given that the estimates are smaller relative to the 
case of government lending, the concern whether the rent provision can 
sustain is less of a problem. 
This paper builds on the work by Sapienza (2004) and Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) and makes four novel contributions to the literature. First, unlike the 
prior literature studying political rent seeking in public sector banks, this study 
focuses on an economy with a fully privatized banking sector where the reason 
for existence of political rent seeking is not obvious. Whereas privatization 
should help eliminate the politically motivated resource allocation, boost 
efficiency and ultimately diminish rent-seeking behaviour, I document the 
existence of significant political rents in the Mexican banking sector. Second, 
using a time-varying measure, this study can exploit the within-firm variation 
by comparing a firm’s loan terms and performance when it is politically 
connected and when it is not. The political connection measure used in this 
paper, firms operating in the politician's state, allows me to target a broader 
sample of borrowers and thus provide a more general evidence of political 
rents in bank lending. Third, using a matched bank-firm data, this paper can 
demonstrate how political considerations in bank lending have important 
effects on firm’s real economic outcomes. Specifically, I show that while 
firms use the excess credit supply to hire new employees the performance 
barely improves. Finally, the paper provides evidence of quid pro quo as 
banks that extend more political loans receive more and better public loans. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the 
Mexican banking sector and political systems. Chapter 3 describes the data 
8 
 
and methodology. Chapter 4 and 5 report the main empirical results. Chapter 6 
and 7 presents robustness check and cost-benefit analysis, and Chapter 8 
concludes.   
9 
 
Chapter 2. Institutional Details and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Political System   
 
The Mexican Congress comprises the legislative branch of the government 
and as such, its main function is to write new laws and modify existing ones. 
As in the United States, the Congress of Mexico is a bicameral body 
composed of two separate assemblies: the Chamber of Deputies (or the lower 
house) and the Senate (the upper chamber). Whereas the lower house has 500 
deputies that are elected every legislative session, or every three years, the 
upper chamber consists of 128 senators that serve for two sessions coinciding 
with the presidential six-year term
7
.  
To investigate the political influence on bank lending to firms, I focus on 
connections to senators – rather than deputies – for several reasons. First, 
similar to the case in the United States, senators are perceived to be more 
influential than deputies since they have the power to review and 
approve/reject appointees and treaties made by the executive branch.   Second, 
whereas deputies represent proportionally their constituents within a state, 
senators are selected to represent states. Each of the 32 states in Mexico has a 
fixed number of senators representing their interests
8
.  Third, when firms 
relocate their headquarters, they often move within the same state (possibly in 
                                                 
7
 The 128 senators in Mexico are selected at the state level. Out of all senators, 96 are elected 
by popular vote with every political party nominating two candidates for each of the 32 states. 
The party that obtained the highest vote elects two senators, while the second most voted party 
elects the candidate heading the party list. The 32 remaining seats are distributed among the 
parties in proportion to their share of the national vote. 
8
 While the most and least populous states in Mexico (Estado de Mexico and Colima) have 66 
and 6 deputies respectively, they both have three senators. To guarantee that deputies 
represent the constituents, deputies are selected at the electoral district level. Based on the 
distribution of population across the country, the territory is divided into 300 electoral districts, 
each with a similar number of constituents. 
10 
 
a different electoral district) and rarely across state boundaries (Kostovetsky, 
2015).  
The most relevant work of senators is done through the permanent committees. 
Committees are formed during the first month of a legislature and last for its 
three-year duration
9
.  These groups are regulated by the Ley Organica del 
Congreso and consist of a team of senators, headed by a chairman, supervising 
and drafting legislative bills on topics within their purview. This study focuses 
on the president of the commission, and not on all committee members, given 
that in Mexico committee members have considerably less power compared to 
the chair (Rivera Sanchez, 2004). Presiding a committee is politically 
important since chairmen propose and direct the bills, have formal contact 
with the government, and access to important information and economic 
resources to be distributed in a relatively discretionary way
10
.  Therefore, as 
chairmen of important committees, senators gain greater media and political 
exposure (Langston and Aparicio, 2009) and as a result, they may be better 
able to support firms from their state.  Moreover, being chair of a relevant 
committee may signal that politicians have substantial political influence and 
will have important positions after their term. 
Presiding a committee gives political power not only to the chairman but also 
to his party. Therefore, several weeks of intense negotiations in the senate take 
place behind doors to select the chairmen of the relevant committees. This 
process can be summarized in two stages: First, each party postulates senators 
                                                 
9
 The sample period spans through three legislative sessions: LIX-LXI. Legislative session 
LIX starts in September of 2003, while legislatures LX and LXI start in September of 2006 
and September of 2009 respectively. 
10
 Recent studies show evidence that leakage of important macro-news and policies affects the 
distribution of private information in the financial market. (e.g. Bernile, Hu and Tang, 2015; 
Agarwal, et al.,2015b). 
11 
 
to chair the committees that best match their expertise and interest. In the 
second stage, the political groups in the senate negotiate the committee chairs, 
guaranteeing that its distribution is proportional to the seats that each party 
holds in the senate.  
The relative importance of the committees varies substantially depending on 
the topics they legislate, the operating funds they receive, and more 
importantly, the number and influence of bills in their purview (Langston and 
Aparicio, 2009). The most important and contested committees are those that 
deal with economic, fiscal and budgetary topics (Garcia and Sanchez, 2002)
11
.  
While there is no unique ranking of the more influential committees, Ballinas 
and Becerril (2012) identify the following committees as the most influential: 
Administration, Agriculture, Commerce, Constitution, Energy, Governance, 
Legislation, Legislation I, Legislation II, Justice, Telecommunications, 
Transport and Treasury. In terms of legislative work, these committees 
concentrate around 78% of all bills received in the Senate in the term of 2003-
2006.  To formally verify the importance of chairing a commission and 
validate this classification of influential commissions, I hand collect 
information on all 256 senators elected in 2000 and 2006 and divide senators 
into three types based on political importance.  The type I includes all senators 
that did not chair any committee; the second type includes all senators who 
have only chaired non-influential committees; while the third type includes all 
remaining senators that have presided an influential committee. As shown in 
Table A2, 44 percent of senators are type I, 42 percent of senators are type II, 
and the remaining 14 percent are type III. 
                                                 
11
 With 60 permanent committees, the Mexican senate is the upper chamber with most 
committees worldwide (Power, 2012; Morales, 2015). 
12 
 
 I further evaluate three indicators of the political importance of the three types 
of senators. The first measure indicates whether the senator headed their 
party’s state list for the senate elections. The second measure is an indicator of 
whether the senator held an important political position in the past, like state 
governor, federal senator, federal deputy, ambassador or secretary at the state 
of federal level. Finally, the third measure is an indicator of whether the 
senator will hold an important political position after chairing the commission, 
including state governor, federal senator or ambassador. The results are 
displayed in Table A2. All measures support this classification and 
corroborate the relative importance of chairing a commission. In the second 
line, we can see that only 44 percent of type I senators headed their party’s list 
for the senate elections, contrasted with 67 percent and 81 percent of type II 
and III senators respectively. Regarding their previous occupations, the third 
line shows that only 4 percent of type I senators had relevant past positions, 
compared with 30 percent and 56 percent of type II and type III senators 
respectively. Finally, once their term as senators ends, chairmen of important 
committees are also more likely to hold important federal or state 
appointments in the future: 5 percent of both type I and II senators end up with 
important political positions, compared with 39 percent of type III senators. 
2.2 Related Research 
 
The paper first adds to the literature of political distortions in the supply of 
credit. This study most closely relates to Sapienza (2004) and Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) since they also use loan-level data to study how political 
connections affect bank lending. Sapienza (2004) presents evidence of Italian 
state-owned banks being used as instruments in the supply of political 
13 
 
patronage: firms located in an area with a relatively stronger political party 
affiliation obtained lower loan spread. Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
show that government banks offer preferential loan terms to politically 
connected firms (those with directors participating in an election). Their 
findings suggest that, on average, politically connected firms borrow 45 
percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. This study differs from 
these two studies since I investigate the political influence on lending in a 
fully privatized economy. Other papers have examined preferential access to 
capital due to political connections in the context of campaign contribution in 
Brazil (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008), agricultural lending in India 
(Cole, 2009) and by comparing cross-country data (Dinc, 2005). As this 
sample covers lending to both large and small firms, this study also enriches 
the literature on small business lending (i.e. Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). 
This work is also related to papers that focus on distributive politics and 
regional favouritism. Hodler and Raschky(2014) documents that the regions 
where current political leaders are born have more intense night-time light and 
GDP growth. This study complements theirs by unveiling a specific but 
important channel through which the politician's support can benefit the local 
economic development: greater credit supply to local firms. Other policies that 
favour politically connected regions documented in the literature include 
national legislation (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2013), national mortgage and 
lending policies prior to the financial crisis (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010), 
biased taxation (Kasara, 2007) as well as the localized public employment 
schemes of state run enterprises (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  
14 
 
Finally, this paper relates to the studies on the broad literature of rent seeking 
and corruption. Olken and Pande (2011) provide a complete review on the 
evidence of corruption in developing countries, including the definition, 
determinants and consequences. Due to its secretive and illicit nature, 
measuring corruption often entails deductive reasoning based on indirect 
evidence (e.g. Reinikka and Svennson, 2004; Olken, 2007; Fang et al., 
2014)
12
 . Fisman (2001) is among the first few studies to use the market 
inference approach to infer the value of political connections. Houston et al. 
(2014) find consistent evidence in the lending market of United States that 
banks charge lower rates because they recognize the enhancement of firm’s 
credit worthiness due to political connection. Faccio (2006) has similar 
findings in a cross-country study with 20,202 publicly traded firms in 47 
countries. Rent seeking is socially harmful since it can lead to the resource 
misallocation and bring significant cost. Evidence on the distortive 
consequences includes poor public good provisions (Campante and Do, 2014), 
high workplace fatalities (Fisman and Wang, 2015) and consumer credit 
under-provision (Agarwal et al., 2015). The paper adds to the literature by 
offering a lower-bound estimate of the economy-wide deadweight loss 
induced by this form of political rents. By documenting the existence of 
political rents in a fully privatized economy, this study also contributes to the 
broad literature on privatizations
13
.  
                                                 
12
 The few notable exceptions that can have a more direct measurement of corruption include 
Mcmillan and Zoido (2004), Olken and Barron (2009) and Sequeira and Djankov (2014). 
13
 Privatization takes different forms in different countries and thus an enormous literature 
devotes to evaluate the efficiency of privatization in the single-country case including Russia 
(Barberis et al,1998; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), Mexico (La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes, 1994), France (Degeorge, et al, 2004), China (Sun and Tong, 2003) and Nigeria 
(Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005). For the complete review of research work on privatization, 








The data in this paper comes from four primary sources. The first is the loan-
level data for the universe of commercial lending in Mexico from 2003 to 
2012.  The second is the monthly bank balance sheet information provided by 
the Bank of Mexico. The third is hand-collected data on personal and 
professional information on all 256 senators elected in 2000 and 2006.  This 
information includes all political occupations as well as the committee 
memberships. Finally, to document variation in real economic outcomes, I use 
yearly information on firms’ balance sheets using the Orbis dataset compiled 
by Bureau van Dijk. 
The loan-level data is a supervisory dataset on the entire universe of 
commercial loans in Mexico from September 2003 to March 2012. The dataset 
was compiled by the Mexican Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) in 
its role as bank supervisor. The data comes from regulatory reports (known as 
R04) sent monthly by every commercial bank to the CNBV.  Reports are 
mandatory, updated electronically, and include detailed characteristics of all 
new and continuing loans made to firms by every bank in Mexico
14
.   All 
business loans, regardless of their size, have to be reported
15
.  
                                                 
14
 To ensure the homogeneity of the data, I exclude sole proprietorships from the sample 
because consumption credit can be confused for commercial credit. 
15
 For example, the threshold is 1.5 million euro in Germany and 41,300 euros in Italy 




For each loan in the CNBV dataset, there is information on the issuing bank, 
the borrower (firm), the outstanding amount, the annualized-loan rate, and the 
start and end date of the loan (maturity). There is also information regarding 
each borrower, such as its identifier, location, industry and number of 
employees. Loans are tracked every month and the evolution can be observed 
until their maturity.  Specifically, I can observe whether the debtor obligation 
is being fulfilled, and in case it is not, by how much and for how long the loan 
has been under-performing.  
The final sample covers three legislatures LIX-LXI spanning from October 
2003 to March 2012, and contains 594,534 loans from 88,117 firms from 21 
banks
16
.   For each loan, only the information at the initial period when the 
loan was extended is kept.  I also record whether the loan is more than 90 days 
in arrears within the 36 months after origination. Some borrowers had more 
than one loan outstanding with the same bank in one quarter. Therefore I adopt 
a similar approach as in La Porta et al. (2003) and aggregate individual loans 
at the firm-bank-quarter level and report loan characteristics such as loan 
spread and maturity at origination using a weighted average by loan volume.  
The only exception is loan volume, which is the sum of the value of all new 
loans that a firm initiated from a certain bank in a given quarter.  During the 
first month of each legislative session, committees are formed with one 
senator appointed as chairman.  For each borrower and quarter, I define the 
dummy variable chairman that equals one if the borrower is headquartered in a 
state with at least one senator serving as the chairman in that quarter and zero 
otherwise.  
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 Legislative session LIX started in September of 2003, while LX and LXI started in 
September of 2006 and September of 2009 respectively. 
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3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
This section discusses the methodology used to analyse whether banks offer 
better loans to firms in a state with a relevant chairman, and whether these 
loans are more likely to eventually default in the future.  I focus on four credit 
margins: loan size (in logs), price of the loan (loan spread), original maturity 
(in months) and a dummy on the existence of collateral.   I also examine the 
loan's ex-post performance by creating an indicator variable of whether loans 
are more than 90 days in arrears. Appendix A presents the detailed definitions 
of each variable.  
As discussed earlier, the major empirical challenge to identify political rents is 
that it is difficult to find a truly exogenous measure of political connection.  A 
widely used method is to define a firm as politically connected when one of its 
large shareholders or top officers is a politician such as a parliament member, 
minister or election participant (e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006). 
Nevertheless, such a static measure brings several identification concerns. 
First, including firm fixed-effects becomes infeasible with such a relatively 
time-invariant variable for each firm.  Therefore, selection bias is always 
present in the estimates of political effect, which may be overstated. For 
example, large enterprises are more likely to attract politicians as shareholders 
or board members: therefore, the observed preferential treatment is an 
inaccurate reflection of political rent.  Second, without considering firm-
specific credit-demand shocks, both the demand and supply channels may 
confound the estimation (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2014).  Third, the 
analysis with the time-invariant measure of political connection is equivalent 
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to a cross-sectional procedure since there is no time variation in the main 
variable of interest. 
Given the above concerns, this paper uses a strategy exploiting within-firm 
variation, and examine whether each firm receives preferential treatment when 
its headquarters are located in a chairman’s state, a proxy for political 
connection, versus when they are not
17
. I adopt a time-variant measure of 
political connection and include firm-bank fixed-effects to exploit variation in 
the credit availability to a firm-bank pair over time and across states.  
Specifically, the baseline identification strategy relates the credit outcome of 
each firm-bank pair in a given quarter, to an indicator of whether the state 
where the firm is headquartered has any senator presiding a committee in that 
same quarter. This benchmark specification is given by the following equation: 
                𝑦𝑓,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑓,𝑏 + 𝛾𝑏,𝑡 
                                            +𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑏,𝑡                                                               (1) 
where 𝑦𝑓,𝑏,𝑡  corresponds to each of the credit margins (logarithm of loan 
volume, loan spread, original maturity and collateral) or the ex-post loan 
performance (an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is in arrears for 
more than 90 days) for a loan obtained by firm f from bank b in quarter t.  The 
variable of interest 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 is an indicator of whether the state where the 
firm f is located has at least one senator as the chairman during quarter t. 𝑋𝑠,𝑡 
includes state-level GDP growth rate and unemployment rate to control for 
time-varying economic conditions in the firm’s state. To isolate the bank 
lending channel, I include firm*bank fixed-effects 𝛾𝑓,𝑏, to exploit the variation 
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 The state from which the chairman comes changes 80% of the time during the three terms 
(21, observed change/26, maximum possible change) 
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within the same firm-bank pair over time. This fixed-effect controls for all 
time-invariant characteristics of firms and banks that proxy for credit demand 
(such as geographical location, bank nationality or firms' economic activity), 
as well as for bank-firm relationships. 
Shocks to credit supply can affect the banks' decision to extend loans (Khwaja 
and Mian, 2008), so I further isolate the unobserved time-varying factor in the 
supply of credit by including bank*period fixed-effects 𝛾𝑏,𝑡.  Finally, I add 
fixed-effects at the industry*quarter level 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 to control for unobserved time-
varying shocks to the industry fundamentals such as risk or investment 
opportunities. This specification compares, at a given time, the credit 
conditions of firms from the chairman's states with those in the same sector 
but headquartered in other states
18
.  Therefore, 𝛽1  captures the preferential 
lending the bank extended to the same firm when it is politically connected 
versus when it is not. 
Since some committees are industry-specific, I also estimate whether the 
preferential treatment extended to politically connected firms differs across 
industries within the same state. The effect is represented by an interaction 
term of 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡  and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑓,𝑡  in the regression outlined in equation 
(2): 
 𝑦𝑓,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑓,𝑡 
                   +𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑓,𝑏 +  𝛾𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑏,𝑡                                               (2)  
where 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑓,𝑡 equals one if for a given firm f, the senator from its state 
chairs the committee directly supervises its industry. The coefficient before 
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 Since almost all (98.7 percent) of firms remain in the same state throughout our sample 
period, firm*bank fixed-effects absorb the state fixed-effects. 
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the interaction term 𝛽2 now becomes the main interest and offers a difference-
in-difference estimate of preferential treatment. It contrasts the credit terms of 
politically connected firms within the same industry versus firms in other 
industries. As with the benchmark specification, I saturate this specification 
with fixed-effects at the firm*bank, bank*quarter and industry*quarter level. 
A similar specification is used to examine the effect for politically connected 
firms that are located in the same municipality as the chairman. 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of this sample. Panel A shows the 
composition of the loan-level data according to loan attribute.  I create six 
dummies for each loan according to whether the loan is: (1) made to 
politically connected firms (firms from the chairman's state); (2) made to 
politically connected firms within the same industry as the chairman; (3) made 
to the politically connected firms located in the municipality in which the 
chairman was born; (4) provided by large banks; (5) provided by domestic 
banks; (6) made to large firms.  The table displays the mean and number of 
observations for each dummy variable. The variable Chairman indicates 
whether a loan is in a state-sector-period with a chairman. On average, 45 
percent of loans are extended to politically connected firms. The variables 
Chairman*SameInd and Chairman*SameMuni represent whether loans are 
made to politically connected firms in the same industry or municipality as 
their chairman. 5 percent of the loans in this sample are from firms in the same 
industry as the chairman, while 6 percent of the loans are obtained by firms 
from the chairman’s municipality. 
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As discussed earlier, the impact of a chairman may vary with bank size since 
there may be scale advantages.  A bank is defined as large if it has on average 
during this sample period more than 150 billion pesos, roughly 13 billion 
dollars, in assets at 2011 prices. Under this classification, 7 out of the 21 banks 
are considered to be large
19
.  The list of banks is presented in Table A1. The 
segmentation of banks is relatively stable throughout the sample period, given 
that the biggest one in the small bank group has substantially lower assets, 93 
billion pesos, than the threshold. Under this division, large banks have 81 
percent of the total number of commercial loans.  Furthermore, 35 percent of 
loans are provided by domestic banks.  The extent of the political rent may 
also vary with firm-level characteristics such as the size of borrowing firm. I 
divide the sample into large and small firms, using 50 employees as the 
threshold. In this sample period, 19 percent of the loans are extended to large 
firms. 
Panel B shows summary statistics of loan-level variables including loan 
volume, loan spread, maturity, collateral and default rate for the full sample, as 
well as for the loans to politically connected and non-connected firms.  The 
average loan is worth roughly MXP 2,776,000 (roughly USD 252,000).  On 
average, politically connected firms receive loans worth MXP 2,857,000 
which are 5.5 percent larger than the average for non-connected firms.  
Furthermore, political loans are also associated with preferential treatment in 
other dimensions. Compared to the rest of loans, political loans have lower 
loan spread spreads (12.3 versus 11.6) with the difference being statistically 
significant at 1 percent. In other words, politically connected firm pay the 
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 Under this classification, the large banks are B1-B7 in Table A2. 
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average loan spreads that are 5.6 % less than those paid by firms without 
political connections. Similarly, politically connected firms face longer 
maturities than non-connected firms do (a statistically significant difference of 
0.09 months). The difference in collateral requirement is much larger in 
magnitude: the probability of having collateral requirement for political loan is 
5 percent lower, or equivalently a 14 percent decrease in relative terms.  The 
political rent hypothesis predicts that political lending takes the form of 
advantageous terms and politically connected firms default on the loans that 
are accumulated with the intention of not being returned (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005). The last row shows the incidence of bad loans in this sample. 
Consistent with the rent-offering hypothesis, the default probability for 
political loans is 0.7 percentage points higher than that of non-political loans. 





Chapter 4. Results: Preferable Lending Terms 
 
This section investigates the link between credit supply and political 
connections. As noted earlier, in order to exclude concerns regarding 
unobserved heterogeneity, all specifications include firm*bank and 
bank*quarter fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
4.1 Lending Terms 
 
Table 2 presents evidence of preferential lending to politically connected firms.  
Column 1 shows the baseline results in terms of credit availability.  The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of loan volume multiplied by 100. The 
point estimate is 0.76 and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that 
credit conditions loosen significantly for the average firm in states with a 
senator heading the committee. To control for unobserved time-variant shocks 
to the industry, I further include industry*quarter fixed-effects in column 2. 
The estimate decreases to 0.72 and remains significant at 1 percent.  More 
concretely, for the same firm, relative to the status of not being connected, 
having the political connection (that is during periods-states with a chairman) 
leads to a 0.72 percent increase in the average loan volume. 
Loan spread and maturity are the least affected margins of politically 
connected firms, since the economic magnitudes are relatively small. Column 
3 suggests that the loan spread charged for loans made to politically connected 
firms is, on average, 2 basis points lower.  When I include industry*quarter 
fixed-effects in Column 4, the estimate remains stable and statistically 
significant at 10 % level.  Columns 5 and 6 report the results for loan maturity.  
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The positive coefficient corroborates the evidence of preferential treatment to 
politically connected firms: political loans on average obtain loans with 
maturity of 0.09 more months than non-political ones.  Relative to the mean, 
political loans have a loan spread 0.2 percent lower and a maturity 0.6 percent 
longer. Finally, the last two columns indicate that loans offered to politically 
connected firms are 1.8 percent less likely to be collateralized.  In relative 
terms, this translates to a lower probability of 5 percent. 
In summary, Table 2 presents evidence of favourable lending to politically 
connected firms by showing that they have more access to credit, can borrow 
at lower rates, with longer maturities and lower collateral requirement than 
their counterparts. This preferential treatment persists after controlling for the 
demand effect of the firm, bank-firm relationship and unobserved time-
varying shock to the bank and industry. Compared to the results in previous 
studies, the estimates of the advantageous loan terms are smaller for at least 
two reasons.  First, this study exploits the within-firm variation and documents 
the existence of political rents offered by private banks rather than by 
government banks, where politicians are more likely to exert influences on the 
lending process.  Second, I use a more generalized and broader measure of 
political connection to draw inferences on the value of connection (firms from 
the politician’s state) by classifying almost half (45 percent) of the loans as 
politically connected. As I narrow the measure of political connection in the 





4.2 Ex Post Performance 
 
I interpret the documented preferential lending as evidence of political rents 
provided to politically connected firms. However, a plausible concern is that 
this may simply reflect better credit quality of politically connected firms 
since banks may have access to “soft information” to support the favourable 
lending decisions (Keys et al, 2010). In this section, I conduct a direct 
examination of this hypothesis by looking at subsequent performance after the 
loan origination. If the preferential lending is motivated by the higher credit 
quality rather than political connections, one should expect a better 
performance for these political loans. 
Following the literature (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2011), I 
examine the share of loans that is more than 90 days past due and use default 
dummy as the dependent variable in Table 3. The default dummy is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if bank loan of a firm-bank pair is with 
more than 90 days in arrears, weighted by loan volume. The result is 
consistent with the political lending hypothesis.  The default probability for 
political loan is 0.7 percentage points significantly higher or equivalently 12 
percent relative to the average default rate. 
4.3 Narrowing Down the Political Connection Measure 
 
This section imposes a stricter restriction on the measure of political 
connection in the baseline analysis and characterizes a firm to be politically 
connected if it has stronger links to the politicians in addition to being located 
in chairman’s state.  Specifically, I use two different methods to measure the 
connection strength. First, I use an industry-specific measure based on the 
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notion that operation in the industry related to the purview of chairman’s 
committee leads to a stronger political connection since a significant portion 
of chairman's power is linked to the specific industry for which the committee 
writes legislation and provides direct regulation. The second measure focuses 
on firms that are located in even narrow geographical areas around the 
political leaders' birthplace and tests whether the beneficiaries of political rent 
seeking are more likely to be firms headquartered close to the politician’s 
hometown.  
I formally test the impact of connection strength on access to credit based on 
these two measures and report the results in Panel A and B of Table 4 
respectively. Columns 1 to 8 show that politically connected firms with 
stronger measure of political connectedness on average obtain much better 
loan terms than firms that merely have their headquarters in the chairmen’s 
home state. For example, when chairman’s areas of governance are mapped to 
firms in their states, these connected firms are able to obtain loan with larger 
amounts by 2.7 percent, lower loan spread of 3.8 basis points. When I use the 
second measure, being in the same municipality, loans are 2.2 percent larger 
and have a 6.4 percent lower probability of collateral requirement.  In 
Columns 9 and 10, I analyse the ex post performance following similar 
specifications as the previous section. Result shows that the political loans 
offered to connected firms with same industry (municipality) are more likely 
to fall into default by 1.8 (2.6) percent in Panel A (B). Overall, these evidences 
provide an internal validation for the baseline measure of political connection 
and suggest that politically connected firms with stronger connection obtain 
even larger rents from banks.  
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Chapter 5. Further Results on Political Rents 
 
5.1 Bank Size 
 
The incentive to extend political lending varies across banks with different 
size. Large banks should have stronger motivation to engage in political 
lending as they have the advantage of economies of scale and should benefit 
more from regulatory favourable policies ex-post.  A bank is defined to be 
large as large if it has, on average during this sample period, more than 150 
billion pesos, in 2011 dollars, in assets (roughly 13 billion dollars). Such 
threshold is based on the observation that the largest of the small banks has 
substantially lower assets, 93 billion, than the threshold. This contributes to a 
more precise identification since this segmentation of banks is stable 
throughout the sample period. 
Table 5 presents the result of tests on loan terms in Column 1 to 8 and ex post 
performance in the last two columns. The coefficient of interest is the 
interaction term that reveals whether politically connected firms are able to 
earn even higher rents from large banks. The result is consistent with the 
above hypothesis and illustrates that political rents to firms located in the 
chairmen's state are mainly provided by large bank. Specifically, compared to 
small banks, I observe that the loans made by large bank to politically 
connected firms are larger by 1.2 percent, charged a loan spread 0.2 basis 
points lower, have a longer maturity by 0.1 months, and less likely to require 
collateral by 1.6 percent.  Columns 9 and 10 confirm the heterogeneity of 
political rents across bank size in terms of ex-post performance. Political loans 
are more likely to be offered by larger banks: the coefficient before the 
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interaction term is positive and statistically significant. The estimate in 
Column 10 indicates that for loans made by small bank to politically 
connected firms, loans made to the same firm by large banks have 
significantly higher default probability by 0.6 percentage points in absolute 
terms, which suggests a 75 percent higher probability relatively.  
5.2 Domestic versus Foreign Bank 
 
This section examines the impact of bank ownership structure on rent-offering 
by comparing the lending of domestic and foreign banks
20
.  There exist two 
conflicting views on this question. On the one hand, the leadership of domestic 
banks tends to have stronger political relations relative to that of foreign banks. 
Therefore, we would expect domestic banks to provide more political loans 
than foreign banks. On the other hand, previous studies suggest that domestic 
agents have a comparative advantage over foreign agents in overcoming some 
of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions (e.g. 
Aizenman and Spiegel, 2002). To the extent that domestic banks are more 
likely to have alternative options, the domestic ownership may hinder bank’s 
incentive to cater to the politicians and offer political rents. 
Table 6 presents evidence suggesting that domestic ownership of the bank is 
more conducive to political rent provision. As can be observed in Columns 1 
through 8, politically connected firms receive 1.1 percent larger loans from 
domestic banks than from foreign banks, and the difference is significant at 1 
percent. Political loans by domestic banks are charged with a similar loan 
spread, maturity and probability of collateral requirement. Most importantly, I 
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 The last column of Table A1 presents the list of domestic and foreign banks. 
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find that loans made by domestic banks to politically firms have significantly 
higher default probability, roughly four times, as demonstrated in Columns 9 
and 10, which lends further support to the notion that domestic banks provide 
greater rents to politically connected firms.  
5.3 The Gradient of Political Power   
 
Do firms with stronger politicians obtain even greater benefit from the bank? I 
use two measures of politician’s strength and focus on two types of states that 
are at the top of the power pyramids. That is, those with more than one senator 
chairing the committee, and those states with a chairman serving in a core 
committee with relatively higher importance, according to a more systematic 
measure. The political lending hypothesis predicts that, all else being equal, 
we should observe stronger pattern for those states given their greater 
influence on bank lending. Table 7 reports the regression results showing the 
effect of having more than one commissioner at a time. All specifications 
control a full set of controls and fixed-effects similar to this benchmark 
exercise. In Panel A, I find that firms headquartered in states with more than 
one committee chairman receive even more favourable lending, roughly three 
times larger, and the political loans also have significant worse ex-post 
performance with default rates four times higher. In Panel B, I limit this 
attention to the core committees that are more relevant to the banking industry, 
such as Legislation, Governance, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Constitution 
and Labor, and find similar result: firms located in states with chairman from 




5.4 Quid Pro Quo: Rewards to the bank 
 
Results so far suggest that politically connected firms receive favourable 
lending from banks. As a reward, we expect the bank or bank management is 
expected to reap some form of benefits from government officials. Among the 
potential benefits outlined in the introduction, I focus on loans extended to 
public firms because public loans are an important part in the bank’s overall 
businesses and on average represent 15 percent of all bank lending during this 
sample period
21
. Borrowing from commercial banks is the primary source for 
the subnational financial obligations as shown in Figure 3. What is more, the 
choice of lender is largely at the politician’s discretion. Therefore, this section 
investigates whether politicians reward the rent providers through public loans 
(i.e. by extending more "business" to them, in the form of public loans). 
I first classify banks into two types according to the share of public loans, as a 
fraction of total commercial loans, and create a dummy variable 
LargePubLoan depending on whether the bank receives high level of public 
loans relative to the median.  To the extent that banks receive benefits in terms 
of large government borrowing, we would expect that the political lending is 
more likely to be provided by banks with high level of public loans. I formally 
test this in Panel A of Table 8. As observed in Column 2 of Panel A, the 
lending from banks with high level of public loans is associated with a further 
0.6 percentage point increase in the amount, roughly doubling the impact of 
having a chairman. Columns 3-8 shows that the loans are with even shorter 
maturity and lower probability of collateral requirement. Finally, columns 9 
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and 10 confirm a higher probability of default for loans made by banks with 
high level of public loans. The results indicate that banks receive rewards in 
terms of more government borrowing for extending the political lending to the 
local firms in the chairman’s state. 
Additionally, I provide a direct piece of evidence by examining the public 
loans given to the state government. Specifically, I aggregate all the public 
loans at the state-banktype (LargePubLoan/SmallPubLoan)-quarter level. The 
panel structure of the data enables me to examine whether the political rent 
provider receives any benefit in the public loan market. Panel B contrasts the 
government borrowing from the two types of banks and is saturated with state-
level controls and a rich set of fixed-effects. First, the state*banktype level 
fixed-effects is included to exclude the possibility of differences across states 
and bank size and explore the variation within each banktype-state pair
22
.  I 
also include quarter fixed-effects to control for any time-varying shocks to the 
macroeconomic environment.  
The results are largely consistent with the “Quid Pro Quo” hypothesis.  As 
expected, banks with high level of public loans get more "business" from the 
government and lend out significantly larger volume of public loans by 13 
percent as shown in Column 1 and 2 of Panel A. More interestingly, I find that 
these public loans are generally of better credit quality, as indicated by the 
significantly lower default rate (0.8 percent lower) in column 10. The results 
on other loan terms are not robust across different specifications, though 
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column 6 of Panel A suggests significantly longer maturity for public loans 
made by banks with high level of public loans. 
To sum up, the results suggest a specific channel of rewards in the form of 
government borrowing with larger volume and better credit quality for banks 
to offer political rents and extend favourable lending to politically connected 
firms. Nevertheless, I should caution that the results here do not aim to 
establish the sequence of whether “the politicians offer rewards to the bank” or 
the “banks provide favourable lending to politically connected firms” comes 
first.  
5.5 Real Effects of the Political Lending    
 
In this section, I investigate whether the effect of political connection in the 
loan market can translate into effects on real outcomes for the borrowers. 
Starting from Bernanke (1983), much of macroeconomic and finance literature 
examines how the credit channel can propagate shocks to lending institutions 
into outcomes in the real economy. However, the data limitations have made it 
difficult to identify the effect on the borrower’s economic outcomes with a 
few exceptions
23
.   I study the impact of political lending on firms’ outcomes 
using a vast sample of matched bank-firm data that merges the loan database 
with balance sheet information of the borrower. The specification is presented 
in Equation (3): 
     𝑦𝑓,𝑡+1 = 𝛼1+ 𝛽1 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑓 +  𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡                                 (3) 
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 Gan (2007) and Almeida et al (2012) document contraction in investment in affected 
borrowers but focus only on firms that have regulatory filings with borrower-level information. 
Chodorow-Reich (2014) relies on the 2008 financial crisis as shock to credit supply and show 
that it has a significant effect on employment at small and medium firms. Carvalho (2014) 
shows in the context of Brazil that firms expand employment near election in exchange for 




where 𝑦𝑓,𝑡+1 corresponds to the firm-level information including revenue and 
employment. The variables are available at the annual frequency and collected 
from Orbis, which include a rich set of financial and ownership information 
for both public and private firms around the world. The variable of interest 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑓,𝑡 indicates whether the state s, where the firm f is located, has at 
least one senator as the chairman at the year t. I cannot include firm*year 
fixed-effects as they would absorb the main independent variable. So I saturate 
the specification with fixed-effects at the firm level to control for time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics and also use year fixed-effects to 
exclude the overall effect of time. β1 is the main coefficient of interest and an 
estimate statistically significant from zero would imply that the preferential 
treatment to politically connected firm has a real impact on real economic 
activity. 
Table 9 presents the results of the impact of political lending on firm-level 
economic activity. Though the merge with Orbis dataset leaves fewer 
observations, I still find that the preferential treatment does translate into real 
effects on firms. The excess credit supply due to political connection has a 
large effect on employment outcome, which is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The economic magnitude of the estimate is also meaningful. 
Having at least one senator serving as the chairman of any committee results 
in an additional increase in employment of 2.1 percentage points in the 
ordinary least squares specification. This estimate is comparable with that in 
Chodorow-Reich (2014), examining the impact of a reduction in credit supply 
due to the financial crisis on the firm-level employment.  
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With larger credit availability, firms become more capable of taking full 
advantage of profitable opportunities; thus, they can increase investment that 
leads to better performance.  Column 3 to 4 also examines the impact of 
excess credit supply on firm’s financial performance. More specifically, the 
political lending increases revenue of firms by 0.8 percent respectively. 
However, the estimates are no longer statistically significant. The “small 
versus large” literature has documented that due to greater asymmetric 
information or smaller buffer saving, smaller borrowers exhibit greater 
sensitivity to credit supply change (i.e. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Chodorow-
Reich, 2014). Therefore, I conduct a subsample analysis with the 
concentration of loan supply effects at small firms with less than 50 employees, 
and document a much stronger effect. For example, political connection leads 
to 2.5 percent increase in employment. This greater sensitivity for small 
borrowers provides supporting evidence of asymmetric information in the 




Chapter 6. Extension and Robustness Tests 
 
6.1 Endogenous Selection of the Chairman   
 
One threat to the identification strategy is an endogenous selection hypothesis. 
More concretely, the possibility that the committee chair is selected based on 
the economic performance of the corresponding sector in his or her state. For 
example, if a senator from Tamaulipas is selected to chair the energy 
committee because the energy sector of Tamaulipas is performing or expected 
to perform better relative to the rest states, the empirical strategy would 
confound the effect of the chairman with the fact that the energy sector of 
Tamaulipas would have bloomed regardless of who the chair is.  
Such an explanation is unlikely given the process by which the committee 
members are selected. At the beginning of the legislature, each parliamentary 
group prepares a list suggesting the committee in which their senators could be 
members given their expertise and interests. All committee members, 
including their chairs, are then selected by the Junta de Coordinacion Politica, 
where senators from different parties bargain to chair the most relevant 
committees
24
.  The final selection of all members of the committees is based 
on the weighted vote of each member of the Junta
25
.   
While the institutional background makes it difficult to believe the 
endogenous selection hypothesis, this section presents several checks 
disproving this explanation. To test whether the selection of chairman actually 
                                                 
24
 The Junta de Coordinacion Politica is a group within the Senate formed by the senators 
leading each parliamentary group, as well as three additional senators: two from the largest 
parliamentary group and one from the smallest one. 
25
 By law, the votes of the members of the Junta are weighted to the number of senators that 
each parliamentary group has (Articulo 81, Ley Organica del Congreso General De los 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos). 
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depends on the relative performance of the sector in his or her state, I first 
compare sectors across states with and without senator serving as the chairman 
in the year when committees are formed (2003, 2006 and 2009). Given the 
data availability, I focus on five sectors: Agriculture, Commerce, Transport, 
Energy and Telecommunications. Sector indicators are obtained from the 
Banco de Informacion of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI) and compiled at the state-year level on the performance of different 
sectors across states and over time. The dataset measures the level of activities 
in each sector with different indicators and contains information on total 
agricultural production, gross production of the commerce sector, registered 
vehicles in circulation, users of electric energy, and length of highway 
network, proxying for the performance of the agriculture, commerce, transport, 
energy and telecommunications sectors respectively.  
The results are presented in Table 10, contradict the endogenous selection 
hypothesis.  For states with a senator chairing the committee, the level of 
economic activity in the corresponding sector is not significantly different 
from that of the same sector in the rest states of Mexico. For example, the 
share of agricultural production relative to state’s GDP in the states with a 
senator heading the agriculture commission is slightly higher than that in the 
other states (6.4 percent vs 4.6 percent), but the difference is not statistically 
significant. To exclude the possibility that the appointment is based on 
expectation of sector performance instead of current level, I also compare the 
growth rate of the sector-level activities in the bottom of Panel A. Again, I 
find no evidence suggesting that the growth of economic activity in the 
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corresponding sector of chairman’s sector is significantly different from that 
of the same sector in other states of Mexico. 
In addition to the sector activity, I also examine the general economic 
condition and compare two key economic indicators, GDP and employment 
growth, for the chairman’s state versus other states when the committee is 
formed in Panel B. As an extension, I plot the time series of GDP and 
employment growth rate throughout this sample periods from 2004 to 2012 in 
Figure 2. As can be observed, the economic development for the chairman’s 
state exhibits no significant difference when compared to the rest of Mexican 
states. Taken together, the results support this identification strategy of using 
the appointment of chairman as an exogenous variation of political connection 
because they are not likely to be endogenously determined. 
6.2 Social Purpose Lending   
 
Another potential explanation for the political lending result is "social purpose 
lending" hypothesis: to fulfil the goal of promoting development in a certain 
sector, the new chairman is likely to engage in projects with social objective 
but low return, pushing banks to extend lending to such projects. This may be 
possible for lending by government banks since, according to the social view, 
they bear the responsibility to maximize social welfare. However, given that 
there are no government-owned banks in Mexico, it is infeasible for politicians 
to enforce such lending for the social purpose.  
Moreover, though the social purpose lending hypothesis can explain the higher 
default rate of political loans, it cannot reconcile with other empirical results 
established in the data. For example, with the motive to promote sector 
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development and social welfare, one would expect the lending to spread 
nationwide instead of targeting only the province from which the chairman 
comes.  
I further provide evidence to dispel the social purpose lending hypothesis. If 
politicians use the political lending to promote development in the sector they 
directly supervise, one should expect the effect to be stronger for small firms, 
which are more credit-constrained and have limited nonbank financing 
channel. As observed in Table 11, favourable lending in Columns 1-8 and the 
ex-post performance of political loans does not vary with firm size. These 
results are in stark contrast to the social lending hypothesis and lend further 
support to the political rent-seeking hypothesis. 
6.3 Randomization of the Chairman Selection 
 
I also perform a falsification test to further examine the robustness of the 
results. Examining the effect of the political connection on lending by 
randomly assigning states with chairmen can serve as a specification check of 
the validity of this political connection measure and exclude the possibility 
that the paper is establishing spurious relationship of having a chairman and 
bank lending.  Table 12 reports the result for the geographical falsification test. 
Specifically, instead of using the real value whether there is a chairman for 
each state, I create an indicator variable and randomly assign thirteen 
commissions chairmen per legislature to a given state
26
.  I re-estimate the 
equation (1) based on this randomization. A significant estimate would raise 
the concern that the documented impact of a chairman is driven by simple 
                                                 
26
 Even through there are 13 committees overall, in some cases a state has more than one 
senator heading a committee in a legislature. 
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spurious variation. However, the coefficients on Chairman in Table 12 are 
indistinguishable from zero and indicate that the identification by the change 
in congressional committee chairman is not due to random variation.  
To validate the power of this falsification test, I do the randomization process 
100 times and repeat the analysis for each sample to obtain a set of 
coefficients.  I plot the coefficient estimate along with the 95% confidence 
interval in Figure A2. As can be observed, the 95% confidence interval 
contains zero for most randomized samples, which indicate that the coefficient 
estimate from the randomization sample is not significantly different from 
zero. I also conduct t-test for all coefficients to test whether the mean of 
coefficient estimate differs from zero and display the result in Table A4 of 
Online Appendix. None of the t-statistics indicates that the coefficient 





Chapter 7. Cost of the Political Rents and Banks’ Incentive 
 
7.1 Estimating the Cost 
 
The political rents identified can introduce a variety of costs including 
wasteful activities used to build political connection and the distortion in entry 
and competition of firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005).  In this section, I focus on 
two types of costs that can be directly inferred from this data: (1) loss due to 
writing off the bad loans; (2) distortion in credit allocation.  
While precise data is not readily available, I perform a back-of-the-envelope 
analysis and estimate the upper and lower bound derived from this universe 
dataset of commercial lending. This calculation here can provide an alternative 
solution for estimating corruption more precisely because recent studies (i.e. 
Kraay and Murrell, 2015) have suggested that survey-based estimation can 
lead to downward bias. In Chapter 5.4, I establish banks with higher level of 
public loans relative to the median as the major rent provider, so the default on 
the loans by these banks to politically connected firms suggests a lower bound 
of this estimate. Table A1 indicates that the total annual bank lending from 
these banks is 426.9 billion MXP while 45 percent is extended to politically 
connected firms as shown in Table 1. I also note that the additional default rate 
of political loans is 0.7% in Table 3 and the recovery rate on all loans is 69%. 
Therefore, the total revenue lost from political loans is 0.42 billion MXP 
annually (426.9 *0.45*0.7 %* (1-0.69)). To assess the economic significance 
of the estimate, I compare this number with annual average Mexico’s GDP 
from 2003 to 2012 (11,148 billion MXP) and the total cost of political lending 
is around 0.4 basis point of GDP annually. According to the estimate in one 
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OECD report, the cost of political rent is about 5 percent of total GDP 
worldwide on average. Therefore, this estimate can explain 0.08 percent of 
Mexico’s total cost of political rent per year. 
In addition to the cost of writing off bad debt, excess credit supply driven by 
the political lending can also cause distortion of credit allocation in the 
economy by crowding out lending to other firms.  Under the plausible 
assumption of fixed supply of commercial credit to the same state, firms in the 
chairman’s state but not the same industry that under the chairman’s purview 
are likely to be the “victims” and suffer from the credit under provision. 
Figure 1 offers a consistent lending pattern with this conjecture: in contrast to 
the sharp increase in the lending to the agricultural firms, the credit supply for 
non-agricultural sector has a slight decrease after the appointment of chairman. 
In the unreported test, I examine the within-firm variation in the credit 
outcomes for those firms and find that the lending distortion leads to a 
significant decrease in credit supply for firms when they are located in the 
chairman’s state but operating in industry out of the supervision of chairman’s 
committee.  
7.2 Banks’ Incentive – Net Revenue Estimation 
 
Soft budget constraint enables the government-owned banks to remain solvent 
even in face high level of default. Moreover, government-owned banks often 
bear the role of social welfare maximization. In contrast, private banks face 
harder budge constraint and need to adopt profit-maximizing strategy to 
maintain operation.  In this section, I present evidence of bank’s incentive by 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis for banks that provide political rents. To 
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estimate the benefits to the bank, I follow the part of quid pro quo to focus on 
the additional interest income from the extra government borrowing. I am 
being conservative in this estimate because there may exist plenty of other 
benefits that are either unobservable or difficult to measure. For example, 
political connection can bring favourable policies and discretionary 
government decisions like bailout of failing banks. Again, I focus on the 
subset of banks with government borrowing above median and treat them as 
the major rent provider. Table 8 suggests that banks with high level of public 
loans receive 13% more government borrowings, so I can infer a ballpark 
number for additional government borrowings relative to other banks that are 
not engaged in such activities. Based on the estimate of cost due to writing off 
the bad debt in the previous section and the fact that the average interest rate 
on public loans is 15%, the annual net revenue is 1.05 billion MXP in total or 
0.13 billion for each bank. If I compare the number with the bank’s net income, 
the estimates of net revenue imply about 1.6 percent of the bank’s net income 





Chapter 8. Concluding Remarks 
 
While there is a long tradition in the literature to document that political rent 
seeking can distort the capital allocation process by government-owned banks, 
economists know little about how it affects the credit supply in a privatized 
economy. This paper aims to fill the economic void using loan-level data 
containing all commercial loans in a country with a fully privatized banking 
sector, Mexico. I include a rich set of fixed-effects to absorb any factor driven 
by firm-specific credit demand, banking relationship and time-varying 
industry and bank fundamentals.  Relying on changes in the committee 
chairmanship to identify variation in political connection, this study finds 
compelling evidence that loan terms offered to politically connected firms are 
substantially better than those available to the counterparts. At the same time, 
political loans exhibit much worse performance ex-post. Such political lending 
is mainly offered by large and domestic banks, concentrated for politically 
connected firms with stronger links (same industry or municipality) and 
increase with the politician’s power. Banks receive significantly more 
government borrowings with better credit quality as the reward for offering 
political rents. I also find that the excess credit supply leads to a large and 
significant increase in firm’s employment but has little effect on its revenue. 
The results provide support for the view that banks use lending to politically 
connected firms to exchange favours with politicians and confirm the 
importance of rent-seeking in influencing the lending decisions of financial 
intermediaries, in this case private banks. The study also provides insight on 
the long-standing debate on the long-run benefit of privatization. Privatization 
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advocates often assume that it will necessarily eliminate rent-seeking 
behaviour through competition and crowding out political interventions. 
However, I still find evidence of political rent in bank lending of a privatized 
economy. A better way to overcome the root problem of rent seeking may be 
stricter regulation in terms of increased reporting requirement, scrutiny of 
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Loan Volume is the amount of outstanding bank credit of a firm-bank pair 
(thousands of Mexican pesos). 
Loan Spread is difference between the average annualized loan rate of a firm-
bank pair, weighted by loan volume, and the average annual cost of funds of 
the bank. 
Maturity is the average loan duration (in months) at origination of a firm-bank 
pair, weighted by loan volume. 
D(Collateral) is a dummy indicator that equals one if collateral is used.  
D(Default) is the average of dummy variable that equals one if the loan is 
more than 90 days in arrears during the 36 months after origination. 
Employment is the annual number of employees of a firm. 
Assets are the total assets of the firm in a year (in thousands Mexican pesos). 
Liabilities are the total liabilities of the firm in a year (in thousands Mexican 
pesos). 




Chairman is a dummy variable that equals one if the state where the firm is 
headquartered has a senator serving as chairman. 
SameInd is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm operates in an 
industry that is the focus of a commission (e.g. Energy). 
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SameMuni is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is headquartered in 
the same municipality as the chairman. 
LargeBank is a dummy variable that equals one if the lending bank has more 
than 150 billion pesos on assets, in 2011 dollars, on average during this 
sample period. 
DomBank is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is domestic. 
LargePubLoan is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank extends a 
higher level of loans to public firms (as a share of total loans) relative to the 
median bank during this sample period. Please refer to third column of Table 
A1 for the list of banks and share of public loans. 
LargeFirm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has more than 50 







Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the loan-level summary statistics for data used in this paper. 
Panel A reports the composition of the data according to the loan type while 
Panel B compares the sample mean and difference of loan terms for political 
and non-political loans. SameInd is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm operates in an industry that is the focus of a committee (e.g. energy) and 
SameMuni is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is headquartered in 
the same municipality as a senator. Please refer to Appendix A for the variable 
definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A Composition by Loan Type 
 
N Mean SD 
Chairman 594,534 0.45 0.5 
Chairman*SameInd 594,534 0.05 0.24 
Chairman*SameMuni 594,534 0.06 0.27 
Large Bank  594,534 0.81 0.48 
Domestic Bank 594,534 0.35 0.48 
Large Firm  594,534 0.19 0.39 
Panel B Loan Characteristics 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan Volume  2,776 2,857 2,708 149*** 
(in ‘000MXP)    (-11.86) 
Loan Spread (%) 12.12 11.59 12.26 -0.67*** 
    (2.98) 
Maturity (in months) 15.6 15.60 15.51 0.09** 
    (2.33) 
D(Collateral) 0.36 0.33 0.38 -0.05*** 
    (-39.94) 
D(Default) (%) 6.30 6.70 6.00 0.70*** 






Table 2: Political Connection and Loan Terms 
 
The table reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions of loan 
terms (volume, spread, maturity and collateral) on an indicator variable, 
Chairman, which equals to one if the firm is headquartered in the state that has 
a senator serving as committee chairman. The sample period spans from 
October 2003 to March 2012. A unit of observation is a loan at the firm-bank-
quarter level. The dependent variables (ordered by column) are the firm's loan 
volume (in logarithm multiplied by 100), loan spread (in percent), original 
maturity (in months) and collateral requirement dummy. Please refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions. The yearly state-level GDP growth and 
unemployment rate are included as controls in all specifications.  All 
regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan spread Maturity D (Collateral) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Chairman 0.762** 0.720** -0.019* -0.020* 0.106*** 0.091*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.285) (0.287) (0.011) (0.011) (0.036) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) 
GDP growth rate 13.723* 13.686* -0.250 -0.233 1.961** 1.782** -0.176* -0.164* 
 (7.240) (7.099) (0.239) (0.234) (0.738) (0.735) (0.095) (0.087) 
Unemployment rate 0.083 0.067 -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.021 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 





Table 3: Political Connection and Ex Post Loan Performance 
 
The table studies the ex post performance for political and non-political loans 
from October 2003 to March 2012. The dependent variable, D(Default), is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the loan extended by a bank to a firm in a 
given quarter ever becomes more than 90 days in arrears. Chairman is a 
dummy indicator that equals one if the firm is headquartered in the state that 
has a senator serving as committee chairman. The state-level GDP growth and 
unemployment rate are included as controls in all specifications. All 
regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels. 
 
 D (Default) 
 (1) (2) 
Chairman 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth rate -0.058 -0.054 
 (0.042) (0.041) 
Unemployment rate 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank*Firm Fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter Fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter Fixed-effects No Yes 
R-Square 0.023 0.025 
N 480,354 480,354 
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Table 4: Preferential Treatment and Political Connection Strength 
The table investigates the extent to which the political connection strength affects the favourable treatment of politically connected firms by banks. Panel A 
and B shows the results using two proxies for connection strength respectively: being in the same industry that is under the chairman’s supervision and being 
headquarted in the same municipality as the chairman. A unit of observation is a loan at the firm-bank-quarter level. The dependent variables are loan terms at 
origination and ex post performance respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The state-level yearly GDP growth and unemployment 
rate are included as controls in all specifications. All regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Loan Volume Loan spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A Same Industry           
Chairman 0.386 0.345 -0.015 -0.016 0.118*** 0.099** -0.023*** -0.020*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.280) (0.271) (0.012) (0.012) (0.040) (0.038) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman*SameInd 2.341*** 2.414*** -0.023 -0.022 -0.069 -0.051 0.012 0.013* 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (0.232) (0.220) (0.018) (0.019) (0.045) (0.049) (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm, Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.023 
N 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 480,354 480,354 
Panel B Same Municipality 
Chairman 0.700*** 0.658** -0.019* -0.019* 0.108*** 0.092** -0.023*** -0.020*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.239) (0.245) (0.011) (0.012) (0.039) (0.035) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman* SameMuni 1.544* 1.568* -0.012 -0.010 -0.034 -0.014 -0.045** -0.044** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 (0.925) (0.923) (0.019) (0.018) (0.128) (0.120) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm, Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 
N 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 480,354 480,354 
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Table 5: Preferential Treatment and Bank Size 
 
The table investigates whether the preferential treatment to politically connected firms depends on bank size. A unit of observation is a loan at the firm-bank-
quarter level. The dependent variables in Column 1 to 8 are loan terms at origination and ex post performance respectively in Column 9 and 10. LargeBank is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the lending bank has more than 150 billion pesos in assets, in 2011 dollars, on average during this sample period. Please 
refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The state-level yearly GDP growth and unemployment rate are included as controls in all specifications. All 
regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Chairman 0.868*** 0.768*** -0.015* -0.015* 0.083*** 0.069*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 0.007** 0.008*** 
 
(0.253) (0.193) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Chairman*LargeBank 1.237** 1.155* -0.006 -0.002 0.134** 0.127** -0.016* -0.016* 0.007** 0.006* 
 (0.601) (0.603) (0.022) (0.021) (0.053) (0.056) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.024 0.025 0.416 0.417 0.206 0.207 0.445 0.449 0.020 0.022 








Table 6: Preferential Treatment and Bank Ownership: Domestic versus Foreign Bank 
 
The table investigates whether the preferential treatment to politically connected firms differs between domestic and foreign banks. A unit of observation is a 
loan at the firm-bank-quarter level. The dependent variables in Panel A and B are loan terms at origination and ex-post performance respectively. DomBank 
indicates whether the loan is extended by a domestic bank. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. The state-level yearly GDP growth and 
unemployment rate are included as controls in all specifications. All regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects.  Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Chairman 0.761*** 0.721*** -0.019* -0.020* 0.106*** 0.091*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 0.005** 0.006*** 
 
(0.254) (0.259) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman*DomBank 1.083* 1.081* 0.007 0.006 0.033 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.622) (0.609) (0.022) (0.022) (0.062) (0.062) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 






Table 7: The Gradient of Political Power 
 
The table examines whether potentially stronger measures of political power will result in larger political lending to the connected firms. A unit of 
observation is a loan at the firm-bank-quarter level. The dependent variables in Panel A and B are loan terms at origination and ex post performance 
respectively. MoreThanOne is a dummy variable that equals one if the state where the firm is located has more than one senator chairing committees. The 
state-level GDP growth and unemployment rate are included as controls in all specifications. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. All 
regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Loan Volume Loan spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A More than One Chairman 
Chairman 0.742** 0.701** -0.018 -0.019 0.105*** 0.089** -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.294) (0.296) (0.011) (0.012) (0.037) (0.034) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman* MoreThanOne 1.328* 1.237* -0.043 -0.041 0.090 0.154 0.007 0.009 0.022** 0.020** 
 (0.697) (0.724) (0.055) (0.056) (0.234) (0.202) (0.028) (0.025) (0.008) (0.009) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm, Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 
N 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 480,354 480,354 
Panel B Alternative Definition of Core Committees 
Chairman 0.845*** 0.803** -0.022* -0.022* 0.108*** 0.093*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.291) (0.293) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm, Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 




Table 8: Quid Pro Quo: Rewards to the Bank 
The table investigates whether banks who extend more favorable loans to politically connected firms, also extend more loans to public firms as a reward. The 
dependent variables in Panel A and B are loan terms at origination and ex post performance for public loans respectively. LargePubLoan (SmallPubLoan) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank receives high (low) level of public loans relative to the median. In Panel A, I examine the political lending made 
by banks that extend a relatively high level of public loans. In Panel B, I focus on the public loans lent by the bank and a unit of observation is a loan at the 
state-banktype(LargePubLoan/SmallPubLoan)-quarter level.  Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. State-level GDP growth and unemployment 
rate are included as controls in all specifications.  All regressions include state*banktype fixed-effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A Lending by Banks with High Level of Public Loan 
Chairman 0.762** 0.719** -0.019* -0.020* 0.106*** 0.091*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.290) (0.290) (0.011) (0.012) (0.036) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman* LargePubLoan 0.658* 0.639* 0.052 0.053 -0.005 -0.010 -0.036*** -0.036*** 0.009*** 0.008** 
 (0.398) (0.379) (0.032) (0.033) (0.067) (0.066) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm, Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 
N 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 480,354 480,354 
Panel B Public Loans 
Chairman*SmallPubLoan -0.065 -0.030 -0.107 -0.062 0.284 0.481* 0.004 0.015* -0.008 -0.007 
 
(0.109) (0.100) (0.139) (0.083) (0.426) (0.286) (0.017) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Chairman* LargePubLoan 0.149* 0.132* -0.101 -0.060 0.242 0.487* 0.004 0.008 -0.009* -0.008* 
 (0.091) (0.079) (0.135) (0.081) (0.423) (0.290) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*BankType FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.768 0.815 0.122 0.694 0.305 0.668 0.304 0.845 0.255 0.422 
N 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 
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Table 9: Real Effect of the Political Lending 
 
The table examines whether the political lending has real impacts on the 
economic activity of the firm. The unit of observation is at firm-year level. 
Columns 1 and 3 report the estimates for full sample while Column 2 and 4 
present the results for small firms with less than 50 employees. The dependent 
variables are in logs and include number of employees and revenue. Chairman 
equals to one if the firm is headquartered in the state that has a senator serving 
as committee chairman. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
All regressions include firm and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Employment Revenue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Small All Small 
Chairman 0.021*** 0.025* 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.040 







Table 10: Chairman Appointment and Sector Activities 
 
This table investigates whether the selection of chairman is endogenously 
determined by the development of his state of origin. Panel A compares 
sector-level productivity (both level and growth rate) in five sectors 
(Agriculture, Commerce, Transport, Energy and Telecommunications) for 
states with and without a senator serving as chairman in the corresponding 
sector in the year committees are formed (2003, 2006 and 2009). I use 
indicators (by row order) to proxy for productivity of the sectors reported for a 
given state and year. The indicators are obtained from the Banco de 
Informacion of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 
Panel B displays similar comparison by focusing on two important 
macroeconomic indicators at the state level, growth rate of GDP and of 
employment. Columns 1 and 2 report the mean of each sector's productivity 
indicator for states with and without at least one senator presiding the 
corresponding committee while Column 3 shows the mean difference betIen 
the two groups with the t-statistics reported in the underlying parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 States with Chairman States without  
Difference 
(t-statistics) 
Panel A Productivity of Sectors  
Level 
Total agricultural production  
(relative to state's GDP) 
0.064 0.046 0.018 
(0.83) 
Gross production of commerce sector 
 (relative to state's GDP) 
0.124 0.125 -0.001 
(0.06) 
Length of highway network  
(relative to state's GDP) 
0.114 0.069 -0.045 
(1.17) 
Registered vehicles in circulation  
(relative to state's population size) 
0.227 0.155 0.072 
(1.14) 
Users of electric energy  
(relative to state's population size) 
0.296 0.294 0.002 
(0.05) 
Growth Rate 
Total agricultural production  
(relative to state's GDP) 
-0.040 0.069 -0.109 
(-1.10) 
Gross production of commerce sector 
 (relative to state's GDP) 
0.076 0.078 -0.002 
(-0.05) 
Length of highway network  
(relative to state's GDP) 
-0.028 0.026 -0.054 
(-0.69) 
Registered vehicles in circulation  
(relative to state's population size) 
-0.104 0.079 -0.183 
(-2.41) 
Users of electric energy  
(relative to state's population size) 
0.017 -0.004 0.020 
(0.20) 
Panel B Economic Indicator 
GDP Growth 
 










Table 11: Social Purpose Lending Hypothesis 
 
The table presents a test for the social lending hypothesis and investigates whether the favorable treatment is related to borrower’s size. A unit of observation 
is a loan at the firm-bank-quarter level. The dependent variables in Panel A and B are loan terms at origination and ex post performance respectively. 
SmallFirm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than 50 employees. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. All regressions 
include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Chairman 0.763** 0.721** -0.019* -0.019* 0.105*** 0.090** -0.021*** -0.018** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.281) (0.284) (0.011) (0.011) (0.038) (0.034) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chairman* SmallFirm -0.037 -0.084 -0.021 -0.019 0.146 0.126 -0.010 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.967) (0.927) (0.027) (0.026) (0.195) (0.184) (0.086) (0.083) (0.011) (0.011) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Square 0.021 0.021 0.414 0.415 0.201 0.202 0.368 0.372 0.021 0.022 
N 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 594,534 480,354 480,354 
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Table 12: Robustness Test: Geographic Randomization 
 
The table presents results for the falsification test in Section VI where I 
randomly assign chairman for each state. A unit of observation is a loan at the 
firm-bank-quarter level. The dependent variables include loan terms at 
origination and ex post performance. Please refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. All regressions include firm*bank and bank*quarter fixed-effects. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Chairman 0.008 -0.004 0.061 0.003 0.001 
 
(0.306) (0.008) (0.051) (0.005) (0.003) 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.024 0.416 0.206 0.445 0.020 






Table A1: The List of Banks 
 
The table displays the list of banks in this paper sorted by the average assets 
from 2003-2012 in constant 2011 prices. Column 2 presents the total assets, in 
millions of pesos, and the first 7 banks have on average assets above 150 
billion pesos (roughly 13 billion dollars) are considered large. Column 3, 
displays the average value of commercial loans outstanding in millions of 
pesos. Column 4 lists the share of public loans over total loans. The last 
column indicates whether the bank is a domestic bank or not. 





B1 959,704 155,851 23.8 No 
B2 853,617 106,419 14.0 No 
B3 603,416 102,349 18.2 No 
B4 459,442 84,799 21.3 Yes 
B5 372,911 67,947 23.6 No 
B6 166,519 91,799 5.9 Yes 
B7 157,982 28,451 20.8 No 
B8 63,016 30,016 12.7 Yes 
B9 55,136 11,674 7.9 Yes 
B10 50,853 7,254 62.7 Yes 
B11 40,331 4,676 19.3 Yes 
B12 34,828 10,304 1.0 Yes 
B13 25,472 5,505 17.7 Yes 
B14 22,708 4,536 0.0 Yes 
B15 12,970 1,155 0.3 Yes 
B16 12,900 3,305 21.5 Yes 
B17 10,822 4,095 5.9 Yes 
B18 9,678 5,047 1.8 Yes 
B19 6,984 684 0.0 Yes 
B20 3,456 475 0.0 Yes 
B21 1,646 639 0.0 Yes 





Table A2: The Political Importance of Chairing the Committees 
 
The table analyses the relative importance of chairing a commission by 
comparing senators that have presided an influential committee with two other 
types of senators: Type I is composed of all senators that never chaired any 
commission and type II comprises senators that have only chaired less 
influential commissions. The statistics are based on hand-collected 
information on all 256 senators elected in 2000 and 2006. Fraction indicates 
the proportion of senators under each type. Head of Party List is an indicator 
whether the senator was the top candidate from a party in the senate elections 
of a given state. Past and Future position are indicators whether the senator has 
had important political positions (including governor, senator, ambassador or 
deputy) in the past and future. 
 
 Type I Type II Type III 
 








Fraction (%) 44 42 14 
Head of Party List (%) 44 67 81 
Past Position (%) 4 30 56 





Table A3: Geographic Randomization and T-Test for the Coefficient 
Estimates 
As an extension for the falsification test in VI.D, I do the randomization 
process 100 times and repeat the analysis for each sample to obtain a set of 
coefficients. The table presents the result for the t-test whether the mean of 
coefficient estimate differs from zero. The dependent variables include loan 
terms at origination and ex post performance. Please refer to Appendix A for 
variable definitions. State-level GDP growth and unemployment rate are 
included as controls in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Loan Volume Loan Spread Maturity D(Collateral) D(Default)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Chairman 0.064 -0.003* 0.005 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.041) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) 
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 



















Figure 1: Lending in Colima versus Rest of Mexico 
 
 
The figure compares the total lending to the agriculture sector in the state of Colima 
with the total lending to the other sectors in Colima and to the other states in Mexico 
excluding Colima, around the time when the senator from Colima was appointed 
chairman of the agricultural committee. The horizontal axis presents the length in 
quarters since the election and the vertical axis shows loan volume normalized to 1 in 
the quarter of the chairmanship appointment. 
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The figure compares the annual GDP and employment growth rate for states with and 
without a senator serving as chairman. 
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Figure 3: Contrasting Sources of Subnational Financial Obligations 
 
 
The figure plots the proportion of four sources – borrowing from commercial bank, 
development bank, issuing bond and others - for the subnational financial obligation 
from 2007 to 2012. The data source is the annual report issued by Mexican Ministry 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012





Figure A1: Lending in Colima versus Rest of Mexico-Other Loan Terms 
 
The figure compares other loan terms including loan spread, maturity, collateral 
requirement and ex post performance to agriculture and all industries for the state of 
Colima with that of other states in Mexico (excluding Colima) around the time when 
the senator from Colima is appointed to chair of the agricultural committee. The 
horizontal axis presents the length in quarters since the election for the chairman, and 
the vertical axis shows loan volumes which are normalized to 100 in the quarter 
before the chairmanship appointment. 
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The figure plots the mean and confidence interval for the set of coefficient estimates 
from the generalized random samples. I achieve this by first doing the randomization 
process 100 times to generate 100 random samples then repeating the analysis for 
each sample to obtain a set of coefficient estimate and statistics. The horizontal red 
line indicates the zero level. 
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